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SLOTTING IN THE RETAIL GROCERY BUSINESS: DOES
IT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC POLICY GOAL OF
PROTECTING BUSINESSES AGAINST PRICE
DISCRIMINATION?
Robert J. Aalberts* and L. Lynn Judd**
INTRODUCTION
A recent development in the retail grocery business is impairing the ability
of small, independent grocery stores and potential manufacturers of new food
products to compete fairly with their larger, more powerful rivals. Grocery
retailers have begun to demand payment from manufacturers and suppliers in
exchange for grocery store shelf space. This practice has been termed "slot-
ting" and the payments asked for by retailers are called slotting allowances.'
Slotting is becoming an expensive and pervasive characteristic of the retail
grocery business. In fact, it has been reported that as much as $9.5 billion in
manufacturers' capital, once targeted for promotions, is being siphoned off to
pay for slotting.2 Slotting has only become a common practice since the early
1980s. 3 The practice became possible largely because grocery chains have con-
solidated into regional giants and now have the leverage to demand these fees.
Moreover, supermarkets are now equipped with such technological advantages
as computerized checkout-scanning systems. These systems enable supermar-
kets to quickly determine which products are, or are not, selling so that they
can decide what and how much of a product to stock.4 In turn, the data pro-
vided by these scanning systems is also used to set the supermarkets' slotting
fees. 5
The major objection to slotting allowances is that they are not applied in an
evenhanded manner by those involved in the distribution and sale of food.
Those most adversely affected have been the smaller entrepreneurs and other
Associate Professor of Business Law, Louisiana State University in Shreveport; Member of
the Louisiana Bar; J.D., Loyola University in New Orleans, 1982; M.A., University of Missouri in
Columbia, 1974.
** Chairman of the Marketing Department, California State University in San Bernadino;
Ph.D., University of North Texas, 1980.
1. See Gibson, Supermarkets Demand Food Firms' Payments Just to Get on the Shelf Wall
St. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at Al, col. 6; Taylor, Slotting Allowances Getting FTC Scrutiny, Supermar-
ket News, July 11, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
2. Freeman & Meyers, Grocer 'Fee' Hampers New-Product Launches, ADVERTISING AGE,
Aug. 3, 1987, at 1, 1.
3. Id. at 60.
4. Gibson, supra note 1, at Al, col 6.
5. See Kanner, Shelf Control, NEw YORK, Jan. 22, 1990, at 22, 22.
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aspiring entrants into the food market who are now limited or precluded from
gaining shelf space due to the onerous costs." A case in point is Old Capital, a
producer of microwave popcorn, which was required to pay $86,000 by the
Shoprite Stores to stock $172,000 of its product.7 After only six weeks, when
the popcorn did not sell, Shoprite removed the product from its shelves.8
In contrast to what has been happening to the smaller supplier, the larger
established food processors are often treated with greater deference. Kraft, for
example, generally pays fees only on its frozen food line.9 Thus, because of the
supermarkets' need to stock such consumer-demanded products as Tide laun-
dry detergent and Miracle Whip salad dressing, major manufacturers and sup-
pliers, such as Proctor & Gamble and Kraft, receive free shelf space for these
items.10
Retail grocers, in their own defense, contend that they do not have to exert
any pressure on their suppliers to pay shelving fees. 1 In fact, retailers main-
tain that the larger, richer processors, who can easily afford to pay for a new
or existing product line, have accepted the practice as part of the cost of doing
business. 2 Moreover, the processors willingly compete against similarly situ-
ated processors by offering to pay greater slotting allowances than their
competitors."
The existence of slotting has thus created economic pressures which come
from two directions: from that of the powerful retailer forcing the processor to
pay for shelf space, and among manufacturers competing against each other to
gain shelf space. Both practices are disastrous for the smaller food processor
and entrepreneur. Due to these discriminatory practices, smaller companies
may be effectively eliminated from selling their product. Moreover, the prac-
tice may also harm the smaller retailer who lacks the clout necessary to ex-
tract slotting fees from processors. These retailers lose a competitive edge to
their bigger industry rivals who can afford to offer discounts to consumers
because of the fees. Ultimately, consumers may be harmed as well. They may,
for example, be deprived of product innovations and, as a result, be exposed to
a restricted variety of products due to slotting.
The purpose of this Article is to discuss various antitrust implications of
slotting."' The Article begins with a brief discussion of the current state of
6. See Freeman & Meyers, supra note 2, at 1 (relating the story of a Utah ice cream maker
who was unable to market his new product in California when two 30-store chains demanded
$20,000 each to put his product in their freezers).
7. Gibson, supra note 1, at Al, col. 6.
8. Id.
9. Id.




14. While legal commentary on the practice of slotting is lacking, several articles in trade jour-
nals and newspapers have addressed the problems created by slotting. See Dagnoli & Erickson,
Grocery Retailers Get Tougher, ADVERTISING AGE, May 15, 1989, at 4; De Santa, Clogging the
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affairs in the grocery industry. Next, the Article discusses the history of the
Robinson-Patman Act ("Act") 15 and demonstrates how the Act has generally
been applied. The Article then analyzes whether sections 2(d) and 2(f) of the
Robinson-Patman Act are applicable to slotting. These two particular sections
are covered because of their traditional applications to promotions and price
discrimination in the retail business.1" Finally, some of the legal and public
policy realities which might limit the efficacy of these antitrust laws on the
practice of slotting are discussed.
The legal arguments advanced in this Article will assume that there is no
collusion between competing retailers, between competing suppliers, or be-
tween retailers and suppliers with the intent to drive their respective competi-
tors out of business. 7 Moreover, it will be assumed that no single grocery store
or chain in the trade area has sufficient market power to be considered an
illegal monopoly.' 8 The focus of this Article will be on the Robinson-Patman
Lifeblood Flow. PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Dec. 1987, at 26; Hume, Miles Combats Slotting Beast
With Information, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 22, 1988, at 12; Kanner, supra note 5, at 22; Slotting
Allowances: Are They Here to Stay?, SALES & MARKETING MGMT., July 1989, at 77; Stroud,
Sage Advice Keeps Vons' Stock Moving, ADVERTISING AGE, May 9, 1988, at S-32; Therrien,
Want Shelf Space at the Supermarket? Ante Up, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 7, 1989, at 60; Weinstein,
New Deal: Out of the Case and Into the Street, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Feb. 1990, at 39; Wein-
stein, It Is a Big Deal, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Aug. 1988, at 92; Taylor, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988).
16. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1978) (interpreting § 2(f) where
seller was under good faith belief that it was meeting competition with the price offered and had
no knowledge that it was price discriminating); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968)
(applying § 2(d) to defendant retailer's practice of inducing promotional discounts from suppliers
who did not pass on the discounts to other retail competitors); O'Connell v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 99
F.R.D. 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying § 2(d) to the alleged discriminatory use of promotional
discount and rebate policies by defendant suppliers).
17. For example, if larger food suppliers coerced a grocery retailer not to buy from a smaller,
upstart food supplier, this could be considered an illegal boycott. It is well settled that such collu-
sion would constitute a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), which provides:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.; see,
e.g., Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (retail store successfully brought suit
against chain of department stores charging that defendant retail chain and suppliers concertedly
refused to deal with plaintiff or agreed to sell to it only at discriminatory prices).
Coercion from large food suppliers which prevents smaller suppliers from dealing with certain
retailers could also be challenged as an illegal, vertical, nonprice restraint in trade under the
Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988); cf. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717
(1988) (holding that it is not a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act where discounting
retailer was dropped by its supplier after competing nondiscounting retailer made several com-
plaints to supplier).
18. Under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), it is illegal to monopolize. Section 2
provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars
if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by impris-
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Act and its applicability to slotting in an effort to demonstrate that, even
under free market conditions, slotting runs afoul of the antitrust laws.
I. THE RETAIL GROCERY BUSINESS
The retail grocery business is a multibillion dollar industry. One recent re-
port indicated that grocery stores were responsible for $351 billion in sales in
1989.19 Supermarkets in general accounted for 73.4% of all grocery sales, and
supermarket chains accounted for 50% of the $351 billion figure.20 The con-
centration of one-half of all grocery sales by supermarket chains is fast ap-
proaching the level of oligopoly power in the retail grocery industry.21 This
concentration of market power has been brought about by a steady trend of
mergers by supermarket chains. 22 While the merger trend has subsided some-
what,2 ' it has been enough to shift the balance of power between manufactur-
ers and retailers in favor of the retailers.2 4 Prior to the 1980s, large manufac-
onment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). The Grinnell Court stated:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.
Id. at 570. Thus, if a giant retailer possessing monopoly power intentionally uses slotting fees to
exclude potential entrants into the market, or if a retailer uses slotting fees as a predatory means
of acquiring monopoly power, its activities would be in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
19. Annual Report of the Grocery Industry-1990, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Mid-April 1990, at
1, 7.
20. Id. at 8.
21. An oligopoly is defined as a market "in which there are only a few sellers, or in which a few
sellers account for most of the market's sales." R. POSNER, ANTITRUST 117 (1974).
22. See Buyouts and Competition Affect Supermarkets, CHAIN STORE AGE EXECUTIVE, Nov.
1988, at 71, 71 (discussing recent mergers as "[a] symbol of the turmoil and change that has
racked the industry for the greater part of the decade").
23. The wave of supermarket mergers has subsided somewhat due, in part, to the recent Su-
preme Court decision in California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990). In American
Stores, the Court held that a private litigant could seek an injunction to force the defendant
supermarket chain to divest itself of the assets of the chain it had just acquired even after the
merger was approved by the Federal Trade Commission. Id. at 1857-61.
That the merger wave in the grocery industry is a very real and threatening force cannot be
questioned and is illustrated by the fact that 30 states filed briefs supporting the state of Califor-
nia in its suit against American Stores. Foust & Smart, The Merger Parade Runs Into a Brick
Wall, BUSINESS WEEK, May 14, 1990, at 38, 38.
While mergers of large grocery retailers may be curtailed by the Court's recent decision, indus-
try experts expect consolidation in the grocery industry to continue in the 1990s through mergers
involving smaller firms. Weinstein, Consolidations: The Urge to Merge Continues, PROGRESSIVE
GROCER, Aug. 1989, at 102.
24. Gibson, supra note 1, at Al, col. 6; see also Van, New Competition in Supermarket Aisles,
Chicago Trib., Oct. 7, 1990, § 7, at 3, col. 2 ("Now retailers really have the upper hand, and
everyone knows it ...." (quoting Stephen Hoch, professor of marketing and behavioral science at
the University of Chicago)).
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turers wielded more power than retail grocers and had the ability to dictate
which products retailers would carry and how much retailers would pay for
the products. 5 Today, however, the onslaught of mergers has created regional
supermarket giants with vast distribution clout.2 6
These supermarket giants have become even more powerful due to the ad-
vent of computerized-checkout scanning systems. With the aid of the detailed
and itemized information that these systems provide, supermarkets are now
able to calculate the profit per foot of both their shelf and warehouse space .
Thus, if an item is a tested performer which consistently brings in a profit, a
supermarket is less likely to demand a slotting allowance. 8 However, if the
item is new or is an inconsistent seller, supermarkets are likely to charge slot-
ting fees.29 This practice hurts potential food product innovators who cannot
get their product to the consumer because they are unable to afford the slot-
ting fees.
Slotting also hurts the small, independent grocer. If smaller grocery retailers
do demand slotting allowances, manufacturers can simply elect to forgo the
small retailer and stock their product only in large supermarket chains where
they are more likely to profit.3 0 If, on the other hand, smaller retailers do not
ask for slotting fees, they will be at a disadvantage since the supermarket
chains that do receive the fees will be able to offer the same products at a
lower price.
Thus, because of the concentration of power in the retail grocery market,
slotting is a potentially powerful tool that the already powerful supermarket
chains may use to gain an even stronger market advantage over their retail
grocery competitors. Further, slotting also serves to inhibit product innovation
and may create complacency in large manufacturers who do not feel com-
pelled to improve their products.8 1
25. Gibson, supra note I, at Al, col. 6.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Profit by the Square Foot, FORBES, Nov. 28, 1988, at 248, 248 (manufacturer of
frozen orange juice made its containers "shorter and stubbier" in order to decrease the amount of
shelf space taken and increase the product's profit per square foot); Van, supra note 24, § 7, at 3,
col. 2 (retailers have the upper hand in the duel with manufacturers over sales and marketing
data).
28. As stated above, items with a strong and consistent demand, like Kraft's Miracle Whip or
Proctor & Gamble's Tide laundry detergent, receive free shelf space. See supra note 10 and ac-
companying text.
29. New items nearly always require a considerable slotting fee and are not guaranteed a spot
on the shelf unless they can quickly show a potential for profit. See supra notes 6-8 and accompa-
nying text.
30. It has long been established that a unilateral refusal to deal does not constitute an antitrust
violation. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (holding that, absent any
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, a manufacturer or trader has the right "freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal").
31. Therrien, supra note 14, at 60, 60 ("If we had had slotting allowances a few years ago, we
might not have had granola, herbal tea, or yogurt .... " (statement of Martin Friedman, pub-
lisher of Gorman's New Product News, a newsletter)).
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II. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW
As a means of better understanding the applicability of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act to slotting, a brief historical overview of the Act is necessary. The
Act itself has been a source of controversy ever since its enactment in 1936. 3
It was the product of the troubled economic times that the United States en-
countered during the Great Depression and was drafted in response to great
public outcry against the economic evils created by chain stores.3
In the period after World War I, multilocation chain stores were exercising
their economic muscle much like they do today in the grocery business. Be-
tween 1926 and 1933, for example, total retail sales from these emerging giants
advanced from 9% of the retail market to 25%.34 Included in this number
were grocery chains, which by 1929 had seized 29% of the retail food mar-
ket.38 One of the prime reasons cited for the chains' successes was their ability
to collusively exert direct purchasing power over suppliers." This, of course,
resulted in discounted prices for the chains at the expense of small, indepen-
dent businesses.3 7 Thus, in the early 1930s, both suppliers and small businesses
successfully lobbied Congress for protection. 8 In 1936, after intense debate,
32. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 382-401 (1978) (arguing that the Act stifles
competition, but fails to prevent.price discrimination); R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
23-29 (1976) (stating that the Act "constitutes one of the great failures of legislative reform");
Rowe, The Robinson-Patman Act-Thirty Years Thereafter, 30 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. 9, 9
(1966) ("That the Robinson-Patman Act ... is the most controversial of our antitrust laws may
be the understatement of the century."); Shniderman, The Robinson-Patman Act: A Critical Ap-
praisal. 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 149, 149-58 (1986)' (reviewing the controversial Act and its conflict
with "hard competition"); Stedman, Twenty-Four Years of the Robinson-Patman Act, 1960 Wis.
L. REV. 197, 218 (calling the Act "a hodge-podge of confusion and inconsistency that any compe-
tent, order-loving lawyer must find offensive").
Aside from persistent attack by commentators, the Act has also been attacked by two presiden-
tial task forces and the Department of Justice. See REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE
ON ANTITRUST POLICY (1968), reprinted in I J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 633-826
(1969); REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION (1969), reprinted in 1
J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 829-81 (1969); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1977) (hereinafter JUSTICE REPORT].
33. For a more detailed and thorough discussion of the events leading up to the enactment of
the Robinson-Patman Act, see Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A Review and Analysis, 51 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1113 (1983).
34. J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 7 (1955).
35. Id. See generally Ross, Winners and Losers Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 27 J.L. &
ECON. 243 (1984) (discussing the economic state of affairs in the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries that lead up to the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act).
36. Calvani, Government Enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 921,
921 (1985) (noting that direct purchasing procedures and combined purchasing power were im-
portant to the success of the chain stores); see also J. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 34, at 1-16
(discussing the economic bases of conflict created by the new methods of organizing distribution in
the early twentieth century).
37. See, e.g., Calvani, supra note 36, at 921 ("The success of the chain stores posed a direct
threat to competing independent single unit establishments .... ").
38. See Hansen, supra note 33, at 1122-23 ("Independent merchants and wholesalers organ-
ized a massive campaign against the 'chain store menace.' "). The original bill, as proposed in
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the Robinson-Patman Act was passed and signed by President Roosevelt.3 9
Despite constant attack and criticism, the Act has withstood proposed amend-
ment as it approaches its fifty-fifth anniversary.'0
III. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: ITS APPLICATION
The Robinson-Patman Act, enacted as an amendment to section 2 of the
Clayton Act,'" prohibits a person engaged in interstate commerce from dis-
criminating in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality.' There are different categories of Robinson-Patman violations
based on the distribution level of the competitor who claims injury. The most
common categories are "primary-line" and "secondary-line" violations. Pri-
Congress, was not intended to be an antitrust statute and was entitled the Wholesale Grocers
Protection Act, H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988). While debate regarding the Act was intense and emo-
tional, Congress held relatively few hearings for a statute of its magnitude.
Congress held very few hearings, considering the sweeping nature of the legislation.
The House Committee held a short set of hearings on the original Patman Bill in the
early summer of 1935; a few more days in February, 1936. Meanwhile the Senate
Committee held no hearings on the Robinson Bill and only two days of hearings on
the Borah-Van Nuys Bill in March, 1936. That was pretty much the extent of the
record developed by Congress.
Statement of Donald I. Baker prepared for Hearings on the Robinson-Patman Act before the
Domestic Council Review Group on Regulatory Reform (Dec. 9, 1975), quoted in JUSTICE RE-
PORT, supra note 32, at 137-38.
For the legislative history of the Act, see H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); S.
REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
40. Congressman Patman once commented:
This law has stood the test of time. It has repeatedly been attacked and after each
encounter with its detractors, this statute has emerged stronger than ever, and it still
stands as solid as the Rock of Gibraltar-a bulwark of protection for the 9 million
small entrepreneurs of this great Nation of ours.
Recent Efforts to Amend or Repeal the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings Before the Ad Hoc
Subcomm. on Antitrust, The Robinson-Patman Act, and Related Matters of the House Comm.
on Small Business (pt. 1), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975) (emphasis added) (statement of Con-
gressman Patman).
41. The current version of § 2 of the Clayton Act appears at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988). Rather
than beginning with § 1, the six subdivisions of the Robinson-Patman Act are denominated 2(a)
through 2(f) to coincide with the denomination of the Clayton Act section that they amend.
42. Section 2(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchas-
ers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of
the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly re-
ceives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
1991]
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mary-line violations involve direct competitors of the seller.' 8 Secondary-line
violations involve competitors of favored purchasers who buy from the same
seller."" There are also tertiary-line violations and violations at even more re-
mote levels. Though rare, tertiary-line cases involve customers of the seller's
customers.' 5 Violations at a fourth, or an even higher level, are possible where
a distribution system utilizes four or more levels.4 6 While violations of the
Robinson-Patman Act can be found at any level of distribution, these classifi-
cations are important since the ability to prove competitive injury becomes
more and more difficult as the remoteness of the level increases.'"
Aside from requiring the existence of price discrimination, section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act also requires some kind of competitive injury.' 8 The
Act delineates three possible types of injury to competition: 1) a substantial
lessening of competition;' 9 2) a tendency to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce; 50 and 3) an injury to, or prevention or destruction of, competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of the
discrimination, or with customers of either of them.51 Thus, under the third
category of possible injuries to competition, both sellers who offer discrimina-
tory prices and preferred buyers who knowingly receive them are guilty of
violating the Robinson-Patman Act.52
43. A violation of the Robinson-Patman Act does not have to be premised on injury to competi-
tion caused by a party on a different level of distribution. Competing retailers or manufacturers
may bring suit under the Act if their ability to compete is injured by one of their direct competi-
tors. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (plaintiff frozen
dessert manufacturer brought suit against competing manufacturers alleging that competitors in-
tentionally sold at unprofitable discriminatory prices in order to reduce plaintiff's market share);
Anheuser-Busch v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961) (national brewer who reduced the price of
its beer in St. Louis while maintaining higher prices in other areas was sued because its actions
caused injury to competing sellers).
44. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (salt manufacturer which provided
quantity discounts to retailers and wholesalers violated the Robinson-Patman Act since not all
buyers could take advantage of the discounts and those who could were able to resell the salt at
lower prices than their competition).
45. See, e.g., Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, 460 U.S. 428, 436 (1983) ("the competitive
injury component of a Robinson-Patman Act violation is not limited to the injury to competition
between the favored and disfavored purchaser; it also encompasses the injury to competition be-
tween their customers").
46. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969) ("Before an injured party
can recover damages under the [Robinson-Patman] Act, he must, of course, be able to show a
causal connection between the price discrimination in violation of the Act and the injury suffered.
This is true regardless of the 'level' in the chain of distribution on which the injury occurs.").
47. This is generally true because the causal connection between the price discrimination and
the injury to competition becomes more attenuated when the price discriminator is on a different
level of distribution. See Hansen, supra note 33, at 1133-42.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988); see supra note 42 (providing text of the statute).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. FTC v. Fred Meyer Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968). For a discussion of the Meyer case, see
infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
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Because of the narrow and not always clear way in which the statute was
written,5" there are also a number of quite specific requirements for an alleged
violation to be covered under the Robinson-Patman Act. The Act will only
apply if there are contemporaneous discriminatory sales5 of commodities,56
which are of like grade and quality, 6 by the same seller to two or more pur-
chasers. 57 Further, there must be an actual purchase, not a lease or consign-
ment,58 and the transaction must actually be in interstate commerce. 59
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of price discrimination, three
defenses can be raised. First, the defendant can claim that there is a cost
justification for the price differential. 60 Second, the defendant may argue that
there has been a change in conditions and that the cost differential is due to a
change in the market, obsolescence, or perishability of the goods.6" Finally, the
defendant can also claim that he was meeting the competition in good faith.62
This defense requires a showing that the seller was charging a discriminatorily
lower price to meet its competitors' price.63
While section 2(a) makes up the bulk of the Robinson-Patman Act, the Act
contains three provisions which are designed to prohibit various, but more sub-
tle, practices of price discrimination.6" Sections (c),65 (d), 66 and (e) 67 of the
53. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 32, at 10-12 (commenting on the Robinson-Patman Act's lack
of legislative clarity); see also FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 530 (1963) (Harlan, J., sepa-
rate memorandum) (referring to the Robinson-Patman Act as a "singularly opaque and elusive
statute").
54. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988); see Atlanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 372 (2d Cir.
1958) ("the time interval is a determining factor").
55. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). The definition of a "commodity" under the Act includes tangible
goods but not services. See, e.g., Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. United Press Int'l, 369 F.2d 268,
270-71 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that news information service supplied by news service company
did not constitute "commodity" within meaning of the Act).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988); see FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 639-40 (1966) (stating
that milk sold under brand name and private labels which is physically and chemically identical is
of "like grade and quality").
57. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988); see Walker Oil Co. v. Hudson Oil Co., 414 F.2d 588, 590 (5th
Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring) ("the discrimination forbidden by § 2(a) is between purchasers from
a common seller-supplier"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1969).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988); see Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d
49 (D.C. Cir.) (discussing the propriety of jury instructions given on the issue of the distinction
between consignment and sale), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1955).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988); see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200
(1974) (holding that illegal restraint in trade must do more than "affect" interstate commerce;
that is, one of the transactions must actually cross a state line).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 13(b).
63. Id.
64. Section 2(b), which does not establish the grounds of a cause of action but merely discusses
the burden of proof in Robinson-Patman violations, reads as follows:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there
has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of re-
butting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the
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Act address brokerage payments extracted by large buyers, and discriminatory
allowances or services, such as promotional advertising. The foregoing three
sections are considered "per se" antitrust violations. This means that there is
no requirement for the plaintiff to prove that there has been a lessening of
competition or a tendency to create a monopoly. 68
Section 2(c), which is generally known as the brokerage provision of the
Robinson-Patman Act, is a self-contained enactment, unrelated to the other
sections of the Act. This section forbids a party to a sales transaction from
paying a fee to the other party, his agent, or his controlled intermediary.6"
Among the prohibited payments are commissions, brokerage or other compen-
sation, and discounts in lieu of brokerage, except for services rendered.70 Sec-
tion 2(c) is aimed at reaching "dummy" brokerage payments that are, in real-
person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirm-
atively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the
discrimination.
Id.
65. Id. § 13(c) (also § 2(c) of the Clayton Act) states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission,
brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except
for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or mer-
chandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative,
or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in be-
half, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction
other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
Id.
66. Id. § 13(d) (also § 2(d) of the Clayton Act) states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the
payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the
course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facil-
ities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the processing, han-
dling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or
offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on
proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such
products or commodities.
Id.
67. Id. § 13(e) (also § 2(e) of the Clayton Act) states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against
another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or without
processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnish-
ing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offer-
ing for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchas-
ers on proportionally equal terms.
Id.
68. The basis for regarding §§ 2(c), (d), and (e) as per se violations was established in FTC v.
Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959) (finding §§ 2(c), (d), and (e) "absolute" proscrip-
tions that require no showing of competitive injury and permit no cost justification defense).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1988). For the text of the statute, see supra note 65. See also E. KINT-
NER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 29-30, 225-47 (1979) (discussing at length the meaning of the
section and the decisions under it).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1988).
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ity, "under the table" price concessions eventually going to the buyer.71
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Act make it unlawful for a merchandiser to
pay anything of value to a customer for any services or facilities provided by
the customer in connection with the resale of the product, or to actually pro-
vide the services or facilities to the customer.7 ' An exception to this can occur
if the payment is made available on proportionally equal terms to all compet-
ing customers. 73 Under sections 2(d) and 2(e), it must be the seller who ten-
ders payment or services or facilities to the customer.74 While the customer is
often a retailer, there is no requirement that this be the case.
75
Congress' original intent in passing sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-
Patman Act was to regulate large retailers' promotional services. Prior to the
Act's passage, retailers frequently used promotional schemes to shift to their
vendors a substantial amount of the retailers' own advertising costs.7" Mean-
while, many smaller retail competitors, who could not bully their vendors in
such a way, were at a competitive disadvantage.7 7 Congress further intended
section 2(d) to encompass much more than just promotions and advertising.78
Hence, the words "services or facilities" were inserted in the statute rather
than just "advertising allowance" or "promotions.1 79
It is important to note that, while sections 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-
Patman Act are directed against the seller and not the buyer, the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") has used section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act ("FTCA")80 to prosecute buyers for engaging in unfair methods of
71. E. KINTrNER. supra note 69, at 29-30.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d)-(e) (1988). For the tex.t of the statutes, see supra notes 66-67. See also
Exquisite Form Brassiere v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (holding that brassiere
manufacturer's discriminatory grant of advertising allowances and the furnishing of free services,
such as trained sales personnel, to facilitate resale of a manufacturer's products were violations of
§§ 2(d) and (e) respectively), cert. denied. 369 U.S. 888 (1962).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d)-(e) (1988).
74. id.
75. The express wording of these statutes refers to discrimination in favor of "purchasers" and
never mentions the word "retailer." See id.
76. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 350 (1968).
77. Id. at 349.
78. See 80 CONG. REC. 9418 (1936). Representative Utterback stated the following:
The existing evil at which this part of the bill is aimed is, of course, the grant of
discriminations under the guise of payments for advertising and promotional services
which, whether or not the services are actually rendered as agreed, results in an ad-
vantage to the customer so favored as compared with others who have to bear the cost
of such services themselves. The prohibitions of the bill, however, are made intention-
ally broader than this one sphere in order to prevent evasion in resort to others by
which the same purpose might be accomplished, and it prohibits payment for such
services or facilities whether furnished "in connection with the processing, handling,
sale, or offering for sale" of the products concerned.
Id. (statement of Representative Utterback).
79. Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 611 (4th Cir.) (stating that words "ser-
vices and facilities" were used instead of "advertising allowance" in order to make the prohibitions
of the statute intentionally broader), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
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competition. 1 Section 5 of the FTCA prohibits "unfair methods of competi-
tion" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. 
'a2
This purposely broad, vague statute"3 was passed in order to empower the
FTC to prohibit both anticompetitive conduct and to protect consumers from
deceptive practices such as unfair packaging and labeling, and the use of dis-
criminatory pricing.
84
Finally, section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act is relevant to the analysis
of the antitrust implications of slotting. That section states that it is unlawful
for "any person engaged in commerce . . . knowingly to induce or receive a
discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section." 85 Thus, under this
provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, it is required that the buyer and seller
have knowledge of the discriminatory price.88
To summarize, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits overt, as well as subtle,
forms of price discrimination by sellers. The outlawed discriminatory practices
include price concessions masquerading as brokerage payments, and payments
tendered by a seller to a customer in exchange for the customer's services or
facilities. In addition to these antitrust restrictions on sellers, buyers can also
be prosecuted under the antitrust laws if they knowingly engage in price dis-
crimination. The analysis now turns to the application of these antitrust provi-
sions to the practice of slotting.
IV. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND SLOTTING
Although there have been cases which challenged practices somewhat simi-
lar to slotting, there have not been any cases in which the legality of slotting
has been directly tested under the Robinson-Patman Act. However, sections
2(d) and 2(f) of the Act, and some cases with fact situations similar to slot-
ting, are particularly relevant for several reasons. One reason is that both 2(d)
and 2(f) have long been applied to promotions in the retail trade business.8
81. See, e.g., Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1962) (finding that the
Federal Trade Commission Act was intended to give the FTC the power to stop every trade prac-
tice which restrains competition or might lead to restraint if not stopped in its incipient stage).
82. Section 5 provides: "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1988).
83. Grand Union, 300 F.2d at 98 (Q 5 of the FTCA "did not define 'unfair competition'; the
concept was left flexible, so that the Commission could apply the broad Congressional standard to
the myriad of fact situations which would arise").
84. See generally 55 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Prac-
tices §§ 747-749 (1971) (discussing the scope and application of the FTCA).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1988).
86. See, e.g., Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80-83 (1978) (finding no viola-
tion of § 2(f) where seller was under good faith belief that it was meeting competition with the
price offered and, therefore, had no knowledge that it was price discriminating).
87. Congress specifically passed § 2(d) in order to regulate promotional services and this section
has consistently been applied to this area of the retail trade. See supra notes 76-79 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the application of § 2(d) and (e) to retailers' promotional services). For a
discussion of the traditional applications of § 2(f), see E. KINTNER, supra note 69, at 273-86;
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Another reason is that because section 2(d) is a "per se" violation, 88 anticom-
petitive effects do not have to be proven.89 This makes 2(d) an especially
strong weapon in determining the future status of slotting as a retail practice.
The following is a discussion of these sections and their possible application to
slotting.
A. The Robinson-Patman Act: Section 2(d) and Case Law
Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits a merchandiser from
paying anything of value to a customer for any services or facilities provided
by the customer in connection with the resale of the merchandiser's product.90
One case which offers guidance in interpreting section 2(d) of the Robinson-
Patman Act as it pertains to slotting is the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc." In Meyer, the defendant operated a chain of
thirteen supermarkets in the Portland, Oregon area.9' As one of its promo-
tions, Meyer annually distributed coupons to consumers which could be re-
deemed for price reductions of up to one-third of the regular price.98 Meyer
financed the promotion by charging the supplier of each featured product a
fee.94 Some, but not all, suppliers would also underwrite the promotion by
granting Meyer price reductions.9 These price reductions were granted by re-
placing, at no cost, a percentage of the goods sold by Meyer during the cam-
paign. 98 The challenged activity involved two suppliers who sold directly only
to Meyer, and transacted the rest of their business through wholesalers who
did not receive any promotional fees. 9 None of Meyer's retail competitors
H. SHNIDERMAN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN PERSPECTIVE 133-50 (1977).
88. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text, which point out the requirement that a
lessening of competition or a tendency toward monopoly must be proved before there is a violation
of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Thus, a food supplier who is injured by a competing
supplier who initiates slotting (primary-line) or a grocer-customer victimized by slotting fees (sec-
ondary-line) could utilize these sections without having to prove the existence of anticompetitive
effects. Because of the directly applicable aspects of § 2(d) and § 2(f) and pertinent case law, this
Article will limit its scope to these two sections of the Robinson-Patman Act.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1988).
91. 390 U.S. 341 (1968); see also O'Connell v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 117 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (interpreting § 2(d) as applied to the alleged discriminatory use of promotional discount
and rebate policies by defendant suppliers while denying class certification to independent
distributors).
92. Meyer, 390 U.S. at 344.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 345. Meyer charged every supplier a fee of at least $350 for each coupon-page adver-
tising that supplier's product. Id. The sum of those fees was more than enough to cover Meyer's
cost of publishing, distributing, and publicizing the coupon books. Id. at n.4. Meyer then charged
10 cents for each of the coupon books and was able to make a "clear profit" on the 138,700 books
sold. Id.
95. Id. at 345.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 346.
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bought directly from the two suppliers in question. 8 Instead, Meyer's retail
competitors purchased their products from the wholesalers served by the two
suppliers. 99 Therefore, Meyer's competitors were unable to benefit from the
promotional allowances Meyer received from the two suppliers.100 Despite the
fact that none of Meyer's retail competitors were direct-buying customers of
the two suppliers, the Court found Meyer guilty of unlawfully inducing suppli-
ers to engage in discriminatory pricing and sales promotion activities prohib-
ited by section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 01 The Court stated that
interpreting "customers" to mean only direct-buying competitors would under-
mine Congress' purpose in enacting section 2(d). 10 Congress intended to deter
indirect price discrimination and improve the competitive position of small re-
tailers.'08 Meyer thus fell within the reach of section 2(d) of the Robinson-
Patman Act.
A second case which is useful in determining the legality of slotting is the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Southgate Brokerage Co. v.
FTC.'04 It should be noted that the defendant in Southgate was found guilty
of violating section 2(c), and not section 2(d), of the Robinson-Patman Act
because its discriminatory pricing involved brokerage activities. 10 However,
because the defendant often acted not as a broker, but in actuality as a pur-
chaser inducing discriminatory payments from processors,'00 the Southgate
decision still sheds light on the legality of slotting.
In Southgate, the defendant was a brokerage company and food distributor-
ship. 10 Southgate engaged in a practice in which it would accept from food
processors certain fees or discounts which it called brokerage fees.' 0 8 Broker-
age fees are commonly paid where a broker actually rendered services, such as
warehousing and reselling, on a seller's behalf.'0 9 Southgate, however, was
often not performing a broker's role, but rather bought the goods for itself in
its own name." 0 The Southgate court ruled that the defendant violated section
2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act by extracting fees from vendors for purchas-
ing, warehousing, or reselling the goods Southgate purchased."' The court
reasoned that these fees amounted to a payment for doing the defendant's own
work and so, in reality, were a mere gratuity. "' Moreover, according to the
98. Id. at 346-47.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 347.
101. Id. at 357-58.
102. Id. at 352.
103. Id. at 349-52.
104. 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945).
105. Id. at 609-11.
106. Id. at 610.
107. Id. at 608.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 609.
110. Id. at 608.
111. Id. at 610-11.
112. Id. at 611.
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court, a "concealed advantage" accrued to Southgate in that it paid a reduced
price for supplies. 1." A buyer who purchased directly, and did not masquerade
as a broker, did not obtain the same advantage. " " Since this was the kind of
discrimination the Robinson-Patman Act was meant to forbid, the court held
that there had been a violation. " 5
B. Application of Section 2(d), Meyer and Southgate to Slotting
Meyer and Southgate demonstrate that the practice of slotting violates sec-
tion 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act in two ways. First, supermarkets often
do not charge slotting fees to such necessary suppliers as Proctor & Gamble
and Kraft, at least for some of their products, but do charge smaller competi-
tors. " 6 This is price discrimination in its truest sense, the kind of practice
condemned in Meyer. Secondly, section 2(d) was originally intended to be
general; that is, the statute was meant to cover illegal payments for "services
and facilities," as well as for promotions.1 1 7 Shelving and displaying products
in a store constitute a type of service. Shelves are part of the supermarket's
facilities. Thus, section 2(d) applies to any discriminatory payments made for
these services and facilities. Because retailers did not charge for shelf space in
the past, the relatively new practice of slotting should be considered a mere
gratuity. As in Southgate, such gratuitous payments violate the Robinson-Pat-
man Act.
In practice, not all suppliers and processors are required to pay slotting fees.
Meyer held that treating suppliers disproportionately violates section 2(d) of
the Robinson-Patman Act." 8 In Meyer, only some vendors were paying for
coupons and replacing their products on the supermarkets' shelves at no
charge, while other vendors were not required to incur this extra cost." The
case does not elaborate upon the criteria the defendant utilized in this discrim-
inatory practice. Nonetheless, the defendant obviously favored one vendor over
another for its own gain and was able to carry out its discriminatory practices
because of its size and clout. In the case of slotting, some smaller vendors
today are not replacing their products free, but, by paying a slotting fee, they
are, in effect, discounting their product. Thus, the difference between slotting
and the practice found illegal in Meyer is only one of method rather than of
substance.
In the Southgate case, the court found a violation of section 2(c) of the




116. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
118. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 357-58 (1968); see supra notes 91-103 and ac-
companying text.
119. Meyer, 390 U.S. at 345.
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thing that the buyer normally did itself.12 0 The court held that such payments
amount to a mere gratuity and are consequently illegal. 12 1 Applying this hold-
ing to the practice of slotting leads to a similar conclusion. Since slotting fees
are relatively recent, on account of the food chains' newly found economic
strength, supplying shelf space and similar services at a price is tantamount to
charging a gratuity. since it is an expense the supermarkets formerly incurred
themselves. Also, the supermarkets cannot attempt to call slotting fees broker-
age fees since, like the Southgate Co., the grocers are buying these products
for themselves for purposes of resale directly to consumers. However, even if
the buyer is a broker, discrimination involving brokerage fees is illegal under
section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act.122
C. Applying Section (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act via the FTCA
Proponents of slotting may argue that section 2(d) can only be used against
sellers and that, therefore, retailers cannot be charged with a violation. While
this has generally been the case, the FTC has applied section 5 of the FTCA
to maintain a section 2(d) violation against a buyer. In Grand Union Co. v.
FTC,2 ' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that even though section
2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act is used only against sellers, the FTC, using
section 5 of the FTCA, can still maintain an action against the buyer if the
buyer "knowingly receives allowances" under section 2(d). 1 2
In Grand Union, the defendant supermarket chain entered into an agree-
ment with an advertising firm under which Grand Union would lease space on
a sign located on Broadway in New York's Times Square for a nominal fee.12
As part of the agreement, Grand Union was required to solicit several of its
suppliers to advertise on the sign.1 26 In exchange for soliciting these suppliers,
Grand Union received substantial cash payments and free advertising from the
advertising firm. 12 7 The court found that Grand Union's actions violated sec-
tion 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act and section 5 of the FTCA.'2 8 The
court conceded that section 2(d) refers only to sellers.1 2 9 Nonetheless, the
court reasoned that, in effect, the payments received by Grand Union lowered
the cost of the supplies it purchased from the participating advertisers. 0
Therefore, Grand Union received an unfair advantage over its retail competi-
120. Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 610-11 (4th Cir. 1945); see supra notes
104-15 and accompanying text.
121. Southgate, 150 F.2d at 611.
122. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
123. 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
124. Id. at 95.
125. Id. at 93.
126. Id. at 94.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 100-01.
129. Id. at 96 (stating that the omission of "buyer" from coverage under § 2(d), which prohib-
its payment for services or facilities for processing or sale, was more "inadvertent than studious").
130. Id.
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tors in direct contravention of the purpose of section 2(d).131
The Grand Union holding demonstrates that grocery retailers who extract
slotting allowances face potential antitrust prosecution. While the facts of
Grand Union are not readily analogous,132 the underlying rationale clearly ap-
plies to the practice of slotting: Grand Union knowingly received a concession
that its competitors did not. The implication for grocery retailers, especially
the larger, more powerful ones, is clear. Retailers who are able to extract slot-
ting allowances from certain suppliers gain an unfair advantage over smaller
retail competitors who lack the economic clout to garner such fees. Thus,
under section 2(d) both the supplier who grants discriminatory allowances and
the buyer who knowingly receives them may incur liability under the Robin-
son-Patman Act and the FTCA respectively.133
D. Robinson-Patman Act: Section 2(f)
The 1979 Supreme Court case entitled Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
FTC (",A & P") 3, has significantly altered the effectiveness of section 2(f) of
the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2(f) prohibits "any person engaged in com-
merce . . . knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is
prohibited by [the Robinson-Patman Act]." '' In A & P, the defendant en-
tered into an agreement with its milk supplier, Borden, under which Borden
would supply milk to all of the defendant's Chicago area A & P stores.136 The
defendant refused Borden's initial offer since one of Borden's competitors
agreed to supply the milk at a lower cost to A & P.137 Borden then submitted
a new offer which was substantially better than its competitor's, and the de-
fendant accepted it.138 The FTC brought suit against A & P for knowingly
inducing or receiving a price discrimination from Borden in violation of section
2(f).13 The Court held that A & P could not be liable since Borden made its
second offer with the good faith intention of meeting its competitor's price. " °Thus, in order for a buyer to be culpable, the seller must also have known that
131. Id. at 94-96.
132. In Grand Union, the buyer was receiving payments for successfully soliciting its suppliers
to advertise with the billboard company. Id. at 93-94. In exchange, Grand Union received cash
and free advertising from the billboard company. Id. In other words, Grand Union received price
concessions on its supplies, but the payments came from a third party, not the supplier. Since the
practice of slotting involves price concessions accorded by the supplier directly, slotting presents
an even stronger case for the application of § 5 of the FTCA than did Grand Union.
133. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text; see also Alterman Foods v. FTC, 497 F.2d
993 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that conduct of wholesaler and retailer in inducing its suppliers to
participate in food shows held for buyers and customers of the wholesaler and retailer was viola-
tive of the FTCA and §§ 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act).
134. 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1988).
136. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 440 U.S. at 72.
137. Id. at 73.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 84-85.
140. Id.
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it was discriminating in its pricing. 1" In other words, even if Buyer X knows it
is receiving a much lower price from Supplier A than from Supplier B, the
price is still legal as long as Supplier A thinks it is in good faith meeting the
price of its competitor Supplier B. At least one commentator has called the
holding of this case the "perfect crime." ' Under A & P, buyers can induce
lower prices from their suppliers, but are immune from liability as long as the
seller does not know its competitors' prices.
In respect to slotting, section 2(f) still may apply, despite the mollifying
effects of the A & P case. Consider the following scenario. Supermarkets are
inducing smaller suppliers to pay slotting fees. These fees amount to a dis-
counted price to the supermarket. The smaller supplier's product will now, in
effect, be cheaper to the supermarket. As long as the seller is aware that it is
paying fees and a larger competitor is not, the buyer would derivatively be
liable as well and hence not protected by the holding of A & P. The pervasive-
ness of slotting, especially the selective nature in which it is practiced, will
create a genuine issue of doubt as to a supplier's claim of innocence or good
faith.
It should be further noted that under section 2(f), it is illegal for a buyer to
induce a supplier to grant discriminatory allowances, as well as discriminatory
prices. This was one of the holdings made by the FTC and upheld by the
Court in the aforementioned Meyer case."" It is currently a common practice
in the retail grocery industry for economically powerful retailers to demand
slotting allowances from small or new suppliers in exchange for grocery store
shelf space.' 4 Further, not all retailers are powerful enough to command slot-
ting fees. Thus, a major chain can induce a supplier to pay slotting fees and
that same supplier will not necessarily grant the same concession to other re-
tailers. In such a case, the buyer has induced the seller to grant a discrimina-
tory allowance. Under the rationale of Meyer, the buyer has violated section
2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
V. LEGAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The current political climate disfavoring the enforcement of the Robinson-
Patman Act and the FTCA may be one of the most formidable barriers to a
victim who decides to fight the practice. Likewise, the federal courts in the last
fifteen years have increasingly construed antitrust laws narrowly, rendering
aspects of these laws nearly irrelevant.1 45 Both trends have been particularly
141. Id. at 82-83.
142. Rosner, Buyer Liability, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 999, 1016 (1984) (stating that the "perfect
crime" can be perpetrated where a buyer gets the lowest possible price from seller A and then
truthfully quotes that price to buyers B, C, and D and asks those buyers to meet A's price).
143. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1968) ("by inducing the suppliers to
discriminate in price, respondents had violated § 2(f) of the Act").
144. This is precisely what the practice of slotting entails. See supra notes 1-13 and accompa-
nying text.
145. See generally Hollander & Sheffet, The Robinson-Patman Act: Boon or Bane for Retail-
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true of the Robinson-Patman Act. From 1975 to 1982, for example, the FTC
issued only six Robinson-Patman complaints and from 1983 to 1985, none
were issued.1"" The courts are also increasingly requiring Robinson-Patman
victims to prove that both they and their competition suffered actual dam-
ages,"" as well as permitting, as in the A & P case, an unscrupulous buyer to
extract discriminatory prices if the seller feels the price is being offered in
good faith. 8
The FTC's reluctance to enforce some antitrust laws stems largely from the
Reagan Administration's opposition to the regulation of business. 49 The Su-
preme Court's likely direction, at least in regard to the Robinson-Patman Act,
is a pro-competitive policy espoused in the 1978 case of National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States.5 ' In that case, the Court found a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act where a society of professional engi-
neers enacted a canon of ethics under which members of the society were pro-
hibited from submitting competitive bids for engineering services.' The
Court noted that in the Sherman Act, Congress sanctioned competition as
"the heart of our national economic policy."' 52 And, indeed, there is no dearth
of scholarly literature on the Robinson-Patman Act's purportedly negative im-
pact on competition.15 3 Thus, because of the executive branch's laissez-faire
attitude toward business and because of the judiciary's emphasis on the impor-
tance of competition, enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act is becoming
increasingly unlikely.
One possible avenue of relief for the smaller competitor is private enforce-
ers?, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 759 (1986) (pointing to the fact that even 50 years after the passage of
the Robinson-Patman Act, independent retailers still have a smaller share of United States mar-
ket than they did in 1936, as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the Act).
146. Whiting, R-P: May It Rest In Peace, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 709, 711 (1986).
147. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding that once a
violation of § 2(a) has been proved, petitioner is still not entitled to "automatic damages" but
must prove antitrust injury and damages).
148. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
149. R. CORLEY & 0. REED, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 682 (1987); see also
Sansolo, Grocers and Government, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, March 1988, at 13, 13-14 (chairman of
the FTC comments that the Robinson-Patman Act should be re-examined by Congress, due to its
anti-competitive, anti-consumer aspects, to see if it is still necessary today).
150. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 695 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)).
153. See, e.g., Austern, Isn't Thirty Years Enough?, 30 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEc. 18, 24 (1966)
(claiming never to have found a situation where a Robinson-Patman judgment resulted in any
increase in competition); Backman, An Economist Looks at the Robinson-Patman Act, 17 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST SEC. 343, 357 (1960) ("In its preoccupation with the elimination or modification of
price differentials, the Robinson-Patman Act tends to foster a poorer allocation of resources
...."); Levi, The Robinson-Patman Act-Is it in the Public Interest?, 1 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC.
60, 75 (1952) (calling for "an attempt to evolve a more coherent philosophy for the preservation
of competition"); Stedman, Twenty-Four Years of the Robinson-Patman Act, 1960 Wis. L. REV.
197, 219 (arguing that the Act may interfere with practices that seem competitively desirable and
that it may deprive buyers and sellers of efficiency, volume production, and volume sales).
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ment.15' In fact, at least one commentator has maintained that the Robinson-
Patman Act retains in the 1980s a great deal of support among small business-
men, perhaps even more now than in the 1930s when it was passed. 15 It
should be noted, however, that the Federal Trade Commission Act vests the
FTC with exclusive authority to enforce section 5.156 As such, private enforce-
ment is precluded under this section.1 57
CONCLUSION
In light of new practices such as slotting, it will be interesting to see what
the future has in store for the retail grocery industry and antitrust laws in
general. Indeed, the FTC is aware of and has researched the practice with the
possibility of launching a full-scale investigation. 58 Thus, it is not inconceiv-
able that President Bush's call for a "kinder, gentler nation," combined with a
possible trend toward protecting consumers and small businesses with more
regulatory action, such actions may signal a change in public policy. '59
154. That private enforcement is a viable alternative was made clear in the recent Supreme
Court decision of California v. American Stores Co., 110 S.Ct 1853 (1990). See supra note 23 for
a brief discussion of that decision.
155. Ross, supra note 35, at 244; see also Shniderman, The Robinson-Patman Act and the
Supreme Court, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 665 (1986) (examining Robinson-Patman decisions from
1978-1985 and concluding that the Act has "staying power" and that the Court is leaning toward
a pro-competitive application of the Act). Not surprisingly, in a 1987 poll of executives and whole-
salers in the grocery business, the larger firms were much more pleased with the current way that
the Robinson-Patman Act was working than smaller firms. See Annual Report of the Grocery
Industry-1987. PROGRESSIVE GROCER, April 1987, at 1, 4. In a 1988 poll, it was further found
that co-op wholesalers are the most vocal complainers about the current way the Robinson-Pat-
man Act is enforced. See Annual Report of the Grocery Industry-1988, PROGRESSIVE GROCER,
April 1988, at 1, 9.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
157. See, e.g., La Salle St. Press v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D.
Ill. 1968) (holding that private litigants may not seek relief under § 5 of the FTCA since the
Commission has original jurisdiction), arfd, 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971).
158. Freeman & Dagnoli, FTC Centers its Sights on Slotting Allowances, ADVERTISING AGE,
July 4, 1988, at 1, 1; Taylor, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1.
159. Calderwood, Antitrust in The Bush Era, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 26, 1988, at 13, 13.
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